Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 4/2022 on the ECJ decision of 22 September 2022 in Case C-538/20, W AG, on the deductibility of foreign final losses

Prepared by the CFE ECJ Task Force
Submitted to the EU Institutions in December 2022

The CFE ECJ Task Force acknowledges the different views on the CJEU’s “final loss” doctrine previously established in *Lidl Belgium* for treaty-exempt permanent establishments, but also notes that the reasoning of that case has been implicitly renounced by the Court in *Timac Agro* and in *W AG*. The *W AG* decision makes it clear that comparability should be examined differently depending on whether the exemption is granted by domestic or tax treaty law. The CFE ECJ Task Force has reservations regarding this distinction. For the taxpayer, exemption has the same economic effects regardless of whether it is adopted through domestic law or tax treaty law. Moreover, *W AG* departs from the Court’s reasoning and thinking in *Lidl Belgium*, which also concerned Germany and the same rules. Ideally, the Court would have made this explicit. Finally, it remains to be seen if *Marks and Spencer* is still “good law” or if *W AG* was one of the final nails in the coffin of the “final loss” doctrine.
This is an Opinion Statement prepared by the CFE ECJ Task Force on W AG, in which the CJEU delivered its decision on 22 September 2022. At issue in W AG was the ability of a German company to deduct the final losses which it had incurred in its UK permanent establishment (PE) because Germany as the State of residence had waived its power to tax the profits (and losses) of that PE under the Germany/UK tax treaty. The CJEU ruled that when the State of residence refrained from exercising its power to tax the profits (and losses) of the foreign PE under a double tax treaty, the situation of a company with a foreign PE was not objectively comparable to the situation of a company with a domestic PE. As such, there was no different treatment of comparable situations and as a corollary, no breach of the freedom of establishment.

I. Background, Facts, and Issues

1. W AG was a public limited company whose registered office and place of management were in Germany. The company operated a securities trading bank. In August 2004, W AG opened a PE in the UK. The PE did not make a profit, so W AG closed it during the first half of 2007. Due to its closure, the losses incurred by the PE during the 2004/2005, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years could not be carried forward in the United Kingdom for tax purposes.

2. W AG tried to set off the losses of the UK PE with its taxable profits but the German tax authorities refused to take account of those losses when determining the amount owed by W in Germany by way of corporation tax and business tax for the 2007 tax year. Although W was liable in Germany to corporation tax on its entire income, the combined effect of the German law on corporate taxation, Paragraph 1 of Körperschaftsteuergesetz (‘the KStG’), and Article XVIII(2) of the Germany/UK tax treaty meant that the losses incurred by its UK PE were excluded from the basis of assessment of its corporation tax. The same applied to business tax, since the provisions of the Gewerbesteuergesetz (Law on local business tax) referred to the determination of profits subject to corporation tax for the purposes of calculating that tax.

3. W challenged this refusal and an action was brought before the Hessisches Finanzgericht (Finance Court, Hesse, Germany). By judgment of 4 September 2018, that court upheld that action. The tax authorities appealed this judgment before the Bundesfinanzhof (the German Federal Finance Court), the referring court. The referring court was unsure whether the losses incurred by W AG’s UK PE should be taken into account for the calculation of the tax payable by W in Germany for the purposes of complying with the freedom of establishment. This was because in the recent Bevola decision, the Danish legislation was found to be in breach of EU law for not allowing the deduction of final losses of the Finnish PE of a Danish company. The facts, in this case, were similar, but in Bevola, the exemption of foreign profit was provided under domestic law and not by a double tax convention, as under the W case. The German Federal Finance Court decided that further clarification was needed, and the following questions were referred to the CJEU.

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1 The CFE ECJ Task Force is formed by CFE Tax Advisors Europe and its members are Alfredo Garcia Prats (Professor at the University of Valencia), Werner Haslehner (Professor at the University of Luxembourg), Volker Heydt (Former official of the European Commission), Eric Kemmeren (Professor of International Taxation and International Tax Law at the Fiscal Institute Tilburg of Tilburg University), Georg Kofler (Chair of this Task Force and Professor at the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law of WU Wien), Michael Lang (Professor at the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law of WU Wien), João Nogueira (Deputy Academic Chairman at IBFD), Christiana HJI Panayi (Professor at Queen Mary University of London), Emmanuel Raingeard de la Blétière (Associate Professor at the University of Rennes, Partner PwC France), Stella Raventós-Calvo (President of AEDAF and Vice-President of CFE), Isabelle Richelle (Co-Chair of the Tax Institute - HEC - University of Liège, Brussels Bar Elegis), Alexander Rust (Professor at the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law of WU Wien), and Rupert Shiers (Partner at Hogan Lovells), Although the Opinion Statement has been drafted by the ECJ Task Force, its content does not necessarily reflect the position of all members of the group. The CFE ECJ Task Force was founded in 1997 and its founding members were Philip Baker, Paul Farmer, Bruno Gangemi, Luc Hinnekens, Albert Raedler, and Stella Raventós-Calvo.

2 DE: ECJ, 22 Sept. 2022, Case C-538/20, Finanzamt B v. W AG, Case Law IBFD.


(1) Did freedom of establishment preclude legislation of a Member State which prevented a resident company from deducting losses incurred by its foreign PE where, first, the company had exhausted the possibilities to deduct those losses in the Member State of the PE and, second, it ceased to receive any income through that PE, so that there was no longer any possibility of account being taken of the losses in that Member State (“final” losses), including if the legislation in question contained an exemption for profits and losses pursuant to the underlying tax treaty?

(2) Could this also be applied in the case of local business taxes - i.e. was the prohibition of deduction of final losses from these business taxes incompatible with the freedom of establishment?

(3) In the event of the closure of the permanent establishment in the other Member State, could there be “final” losses when there was at least a theoretical possibility that the company might once more open in a PE in the Member State?

(4) Are the losses final if they can be carried forward to a subsequent tax period on at least one occasion under the law of the State of the PE, of which account is to be taken by the State in which the parent establishment is resident?

(5) Is the obligation to take account of cross-border “final” losses limited by the amount of losses which the company could have calculated in the PE State, were the taking account of losses not precluded there?

4. In Advocate General Collins’ view, the German tax regime did not restrict the freedom of establishment. The Advocate General argued that “with regard to a tax regime such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a bilateral convention for the avoidance of double taxation, applying the exemption method, subjects to the exclusive power of taxation of the Member State in which they are situated non-resident permanent establishments belonging to a company having its seat in another Member State, the situation of those establishments is not objectively comparable to that of resident permanent establishments of such a company.” 5 As such, the Member State was not precluded from denying the deduction of final losses incurred by a foreign permanent establishment from the taxable profits of its resident head office, where the relevant double tax treaty included the exemption method to avoid double taxation.6 The same conclusion applied as regards the local business taxes (i.e. question 2). 6

5. The Advocate General7 considered the solution in Timac Agro8 as reconcilable with the Court’s approach in the Bevola9 case. The existence of a tax treaty was a decisive factor, as the State of residence was regarded as having effectively and completely waived its power to tax the income of non-resident permanent establishments.10 However, the Advocate General did acknowledge earlier on that the judgment of the CJEU in Bevola, “could be understood to apply to all cases where final losses are incurred by a non-resident permanent establishment irrespective of whether the impossibility of deducting those losses in the State of residence of the parent company results from a unilateral provision of national law or from a bilateral convention for the avoidance of double taxation and whether the method for avoidance of double taxation is the credit method or the exemption method.”11

6. The Advocate General also considered the questions of the referring court seeking clarification as to the concept of final losses, in case the first two questions were answered in the affirmative (i.e. if a breach of the freedom of establishment was found). As regards the question whether losses could be considered to

5 DE: Opinion of Advocate General Collins, 10 Mar. 2022, Case C-538/20, Finanzamt B v. W AG, Case Law IBFD, para 38.
6 Opinion of AG Collins, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 5, paras 55-57.
7 Opinion of Advocate General Collins, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, para 44.
8 DE: ECJ, 17 Dec. 2015, Case C-388/14, Timac Agro Deutschland GmbH v. Finanzamt Sankt Augustin, Case Law IBFD.
9 DK: ECJ, 12 June 2018, Case C-650/16, A/S Bevola, supra n. 4.
10 Opinion of AG Collins, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 5, para 46.
11 Opinion of AG Collins, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 5, para 43.
be ‘final’ where the foreign PE had been closed down but there was a possibility, albeit theoretical, that its parent company might open a new permanent establishment in the Member State of the PE and that the past losses of the former could be offset against the latter’s profits, the Advocate General found that this interpretation would go too far. “Not only would it be practically impossible or excessively difficult for the parent company to demonstrate that such a possibility is not open to it, but that approach would lead to losses incurred by a permanent establishment situated in another Member State never being considered to be final losses, which would render meaningless the obligation to take into account final losses set out in *Marks & Spencer.*”

7. As regards the fourth question, the Advocate General opined that losses incurred by a permanent establishment which have been carried forward from tax periods preceding its closure could not be considered to be ‘final’ losses. He agreed with Advocate General Kokott’s view in other Opinions that losses that were non-final at the end of an assessment period could not subsequently become final. Otherwise, “were it possible to regard accumulated (carried forward) losses as final losses, the initially successful activity of the subsidiary (or of the permanent establishment) would be taxed solely in the State in which it is situated, while the subsequently loss-making activity would be financed by the tax revenue of the State of residence of the parent company, which would be contrary to an appropriate allocation of the power to impose taxes.”

8. As regards the fifth question, i.e. whether the amount of losses should be calculated on the basis of the State of residence of the parent company or the State of the PE, Advocate General Collins thought that in order to ensure equal treatment, the amount of final losses to be taken into account should not exceed that calculated by applying the rules of the parent company’s State of residence (here, Germany). If the amount of the final losses calculated in accordance with the rules of the parent company’s State of residence were to be higher than that calculated in accordance with the rules of the State in which the permanent establishment is situated (here, the United Kingdom), it should be limited to the latter amount.

9. Following the opinion of the Advocate General and the emerging distinction between rules prohibiting the deduction of final losses of a foreign PE as a result of a tax treaty or the unilateral provisions of domestic law, the decision of the CJEU was eagerly anticipated. The judgment of the CJEU was published on 22 September 2022. Although in the main part the CJEU followed the opinion of the Advocate General, it refrained from discussing the questions relating to the interpretation of final losses.

II. The Judgment of the CJEU

10. The judgment of the CJEU was much shorter than Advocate General Collin’s opinion, as it only examined the first question and found that there was no breach. Therefore, according to the CJEU, there was no need to address the remaining questions. In *W AG,* the Court has accepted the German symmetry argument regarding the interpretation of the treaty exemption method (although one should note that other countries have a different understanding of that method and apply e.g. a deduction/re-incorporation system).

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13 Ibid.
17 Opinion of AG Collins, Case C-538/20, *W AG,* supra n. 5, para 74.
18 Opinion of AG Collins, Case C-538/20, *W AG,* supra n. 5, para 75.
19 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, *W AG,* supra n. 2.
11. Citing the Bevola case and older case law, the CJEU reiterated that when resident companies enjoy a tax advantage which consists of allowing them to take into account the losses incurred by a resident permanent establishment but this is prohibited in respect of the losses incurred by a foreign PE, this creates a difference in treatment which could discourage a resident company from carrying on its business through such a permanent establishment. This difference in treatment is permissible only if it concerns situations which are not objectively comparable, or if it is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest proportionate to that objective. Therefore, it was important to examine first the comparability of an internal and a cross-border situation.

12. As regards Member State rules to prevent or mitigate the double taxation of a resident company’s profits, the starting point was that companies which have a permanent establishment in another Member State were not, in principle, in a comparable situation to that of companies with a resident permanent establishment, unless domestic legislation treated those two categories of establishment in the same way for the purposes of taking into account the losses and profits made by them. Here, the CJEU cited the Nordea Bank Danmark and Timac Agro cases.

13. The CJEU made the same distinction as the Advocate General, between treaty-based exemption and unilateral (domestic) exemption of a foreign PE’s profits and losses. It stated that where “the Member State in which a company is resident has waived, pursuant to a double taxation convention, the exercise of its power to tax the profits of the non-resident permanent establishment of that company, situated in another Member State, the situation of a resident company possessing such a permanent establishment is not comparable to that of a resident company possessing a resident permanent establishment in the light of the measures taken by the first Member State in order to prevent or mitigate the double taxation of profits and, symmetrically, the double deduction of resident companies’ losses.”

14. The CJEU argued that this conclusion was aligned with the Bevola case, as in that case the Member State of residence of the company had not, by means of a double taxation convention, waived its power to tax that establishment’s profits. It had decided unilaterally, except in the event of the option, by the company in question, for an international joint taxation scheme, not to take into account the profits made and losses incurred by non-resident permanent establishments of resident companies, even though that Member State would have been competent to do so, which is different. As there was no comparability, there was no restriction to the freedom of establishment. The CJEU saw no need to address the question on local business taxes, nor the interpretation of final losses.

III. Comments

15. This Task Force has already had the opportunity to comment on the case law of the Court relating to cross-border use of losses: A 2009 Opinion Statement analysed the consequences for the State of residence of applying either a worldwide or a territorial taxation and the respective effects on the use of foreign losses.

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21 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 2, para 17.
22 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 2, para 18.
23 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 2, para 20.
24 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 2, para 21.
26 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 2, para 22.
27 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 2, para 24 and DK: ECJ, 12 June 2018, Case C-650/16, A/S Bevola, supra n. 4.
28 See CJEU, 22 September 2022, Case C-538/20, W AG, supra n. 2, para 25.
in light of the Court’s case law. Moreover, a 2015 Opinion Statement on Commission v. UK (“Marks & Spencer II”) addressed a number of issues relating to the question whether losses are “definitive” (“final”). Finally, a 2018 Opinion Statement took up questions of comparability, the relevance of the principle of ability to pay in the context of loss-utilization, and the definition of “definitive” or “final” losses in light of Bevola and other recent decisions.

16. Although this was a relatively short judgment, it raises quite a lot of important questions and once again, challenges the precedential value of Marks & Spencer, as well as subsequent landmark cases with foreign loss-making Pes that followed it; namely, Lidl Belgium and Bevola.

17. In W AG, the CJEU unequivocally makes a distinction between exemption of foreign profits and losses based on domestic rules (the rules of the Member State of the company) and exemption based on a tax treaty. Whilst in both Bevola and W AG the exemption is symmetrical – i.e. both profits and losses are exempt from the tax base of the company – it is not really clear on what basis the CJEU is making the distinction. How is the waiving of taxing rights, under a tax treaty, any different from the waiving of taxing rights under domestic law? While the Court seems to view the former differently based on its bilateral nature under international law, one should not forget that both domestic and tax treaty based regimes may be changed unilaterally (namely in cases where the Member State is allowed to override the treaty) and that the effects on taxpayers are identical. More generally, a focus on the legal origin of an exemption unnecessarily shifts the focus from the economic effects of the tax measures, which are the same regardless of whether they derive from domestic or tax treaty law. These effects should, however, be decisive if the development of the Internal Market is taken as a benchmark. By making a legal distinction based on whether domestic tax rules or DTC rules apply, the CJEU arguably does not contribute to creating a level playing field within the EU Internal Market.

18. It is unclear how W AG relates to the Court’s previous case law. The German legal framework at stake in this case was the same as at issue in Lidl Belgium. Even if the applicable treaty was a different one, the Court did not pay any attention to possible differences in the wording of the relevant provisions of the treaties. While in Lidl Belgium, the Court simply transferred the Marks & Spencer reasoning and the “final loss” doctrine to treaty-exempt foreign permanent establishments (and eventually held against the taxpayer only because the loss was not “final”), the Court in W AG dismissed comparability and did not even get to the point of addressing the question of whether “final” losses existed. Has W AG now, at least in its reasoning, “overruled” Lidl Belgium judgment without even mentioning it? In our view, the answer is clearly yes. Whilst it is not unheard of for the CJEU to deviate from previous judgments especially after the passing of some time, it is not very often that it does so when the impugned legislation and tax treaty exemption provisions are exactly the same, i.e., German rules and treaty interpretation after the year 1999. Ideally, the Court should have made this explicit.

31 UK: ECI, 3 Feb. 2015, Case C-172/13, European Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Case Law IBFD.
32 Opinion Statement ECI-TF 2/2015 of the CFE on the decision of the European Court of Justice in Case C-172/13, European Commission v. United Kingdom (“Final Losses”), concerning the “Marks & Spencer exception”, ET 2016, pp. 87 et seq.
34 Opinion Statement ECI-TF 3/2018 on the CJEU decision of 12 June 2018 in Case C-650/16, Bevola, concerning the utilisation of “definitive losses” attributable to a foreign permanent establishment, ET 2019, 113 et seq.
35 UK: ECI, 10 Apr. 2008, Case C-309/06, Marks & Spencer plc v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Customs and Excise, Case Law IBFD.
36 DE: ECI, 15 May 2008, Case C-414/06, Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co. KG v. Finanzamt Heilbronn, Case Law IBFD.
37 DK: ECI, 12 June 2018, Case C-650/16, A/S Bevola, supra n. 4.
38 DK: ECI, 12 June 2018, Case C-650/16, A/S Bevola, supra n. 4.
19. However, W AG is in line with the second part of Timac Agro. There, the CJEU made a seemingly absolute statement regarding the non-discriminatory nature of Germany’s base exemption without really distinguishing between unilateral or tax treaty exemption, even though that case entailed treaty-based exemption. The CJEU stated that in that case, “it must be held that, since the Federal Republic of Germany does not exercise any tax powers over the profits of such a permanent establishment, the deduction of its losses no longer being permitted in Germany, the situation of a permanent establishment situated in Austria is not comparable to that of a permanent establishment situated in Germany in relation to measures laid down by the Federal Republic of Germany in order to prevent or mitigate the double taxation of a resident company’s profits”.

20. This statement, which concerned the same legal framework as in Lidl Belgium was understood as a departure from that seminal case. However, as pointed out subsequently, in Timac Agro, there were no final losses at stake. In Bevola, the CJEU seized on this point but in doing so, it conflated the issue of comparability with proportionality. The CJEU in that case, found comparability of domestic and foreign situations but the wording suggests that this was limited to situations where there are final losses, especially in light of the ability to pay principle. In other words, the CJEU seems to have rejected the general argument of non-comparability made in Timac Agro, but only in situations where there were final losses. However, whether the losses are final or not is an issue that determines the proportionality of the legislation and not the comparability of situations. In addition, it was not entirely clear from Bevola whether this conclusion applies to situations where base exemption is the result of domestic law only or a tax treaty as well.

21. To an extent, W AG has clarified this point but the judgment builds on the conflated issues arising from Bevola. A combined reading of these cases would suggest that there is comparability between domestic and foreign situations as regards final losses, but not when those losses are exempt as a result of a tax treaty.

22. The Court takes tax treaties into account for assessing compatibility in a variety of cases. For instance, in the decision in Amurta and later cases, whereby the impact of a tax treaty was taken into account as far as the neutralization of the different treatment of domestic and outbound dividends was concerned. However, in those cases, what was at stake was the combined application of source and residence State rules. In assessing the obligations of the source State, the CJEU took into account whether the different treatment was neutralized by a tax treaty but refused to take into account whether the different treatment was neutralized by the domestic rules in the other Member State – i.e. the residence State. In W AG, the CJEU was not asked to determine comparability and/or the neutralization of the different treatment based on the tax rules of the Member State of the PE. The analysis was only from the perspective of the Member

40 DE: ECJ, 17 Dec. 2015, Case C-388/14, Timac Agro, supra n. 8, para 65.
43 See DK: ECJ, 12 June 2018, Case C-650/16, A/S Bevola, supra n. 4., para 38, where it is stated: “as regards losses attributable to a non-resident permanent establishment which has ceased activity and whose losses could not, and no longer can, be deducted from its taxable profits in the Member State in which it carried on its activity, the situation of a resident company possessing such an establishment is not different from that of a resident company possessing a resident permanent establishment, from the point of view of the objective of preventing double deduction of the losses”.
45 NL: ECJ, 8 Nov. 2007, Case C-379/05, Amurta SGPS v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Amsterdam, Case Law IBFD.
46 See, for example, IT: ECJ, 19 Nov. 2009, Case C-540/07, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, Case Law IBFD; ES: ECJ, 3 June 2010, Case C-487/08, European Commission v. Kingdom of Spain, Case Law IBFD.
State of the company. What one could deduce from the *Amurta* line of cases, is that the CJEU shows deference when tax treaties form part of the legal background and takes into account their impact as far as different treatment is concerned. This, however, does not explain why domestic rules, which again form part of the legal background from a one State perspective are not taken into account. In other words, apart from this admittedly far stretched similarity, we do not see any convincing reason why domestic exemption and treaty exemption under the same Member State’s rules should yield different results, as far as the taking into account of foreign PE losses are concerned.

23. Even if we assume that the CJEU’s judgments in *Timac Agro* and *W AG* effectively overruled *Lidl Belgium* (for tax treaty exemption) while upholding *Bevola* (for unilateral domestic exemption), however unconvinced the distinction between domestic and treaty-based exemption, what does this mean in the wider context?

24. What about losses of a cross-border subsidiary rather than a PE? Profits and losses of such foreign controlled subsidiary are also (symmetrically) “exempt”, but the question is if *Timac Agro, W AG, and Bevola* are relevant here as well. If so, is the foreign subsidiary “exempt” under domestic law (because the tax system of the parent’s State does not include foreign profits of nonresident entities) or under tax treaty law (because Article 7(1) first sentence OECD MC allocates the exclusive taxing right to the subsidiary’s residence State)? And would the outcome depend on, e.g., the existence of CFC legislation in the parent’s State or the fact that the parent State taxes dividends received from the foreign subsidiary? This all goes to the core of the issue: Is Marks & Spencer still good law? And does it matter that, even after *Timac Agro*, the Court has upheld Marks & Spencer’s implicit comparability and “final loss” doctrine quite recently in, e.g., *Holmen* and *Memira*? And is it relevant that both *Marks and Spencer* and *Bevola* were Grand Chamber decisions whereas *Timac Agro* and *W AG* were not?

25. While the future of the cases in this area remains to be seen, it would be surprising if final losses of a foreign group company could never be taken into account, but final losses of a foreign PE could be taken into account if the Member State of the company applies a worldwide system of taxation and exempts the profits of foreign PEs unilaterally at its own budgetary expenses and without any reciprocity (i.e. not in the context of a tax treaty). This is irrespective of the fact that the jurisdiction of the parent company (in a group relief scenario) also applies worldwide taxation, because the norm is that profits of foreign subsidiaries are excluded, being separate legal entities, unless the corporate veil can be pierced due to impropriety. Such interpretation would also effectively mean that the *Marks & Spencer*’s final loss test has become inapplicable to group companies, which was the scenario under that landmark case!

26. A further issue that was not addressed by the CJEU but was considered by Advocate General Collins was the interpretation of final losses. Although over the years the CJEU dealt with this concept, the scope of it is still vague, as also shown by the latest questions referred. The CJEU did not have to answer any of these questions, but it seems that the final loss doctrine is still applicable in cases of domestic exemptions such as *Bevola*.

27. Therefore, the questions still persist. Does hypothetical usability of losses (for example, if a PE can be reopened in the future) prevent them from being considered final? Advocate General Collins thought that this reading was too strict, as mentioned above. Can carried forward losses ever become final? The Advocate General was not keen on this, as it would disrupt the appropriate allocation of the power to impose taxes. Another important question left unaddressed is how to calculate the loss – under the home State’s rules or the source State’s rules? Whilst the *Marks & Spencer* case seems to suggest that the losses

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to be deducted should be calculated on the basis of the home State’s (i.e. the State of the parent company) rules, it is unclear what the situation is if the source State rules are stricter and the allowable loss is lower there. Advocate General Collins argued that the lower amount of loss as determined both under home State and source State rules should be accepted.\(^{50}\)

**IV. The Statement**

28. The CFE ECJ Task Force While acknowledges the different views on the CJEU’s “final loss” doctrine previously established in *Lidl Belgium* for treaty-exempt permanent establishments, but also notes that the reasoning of that case has been implicitly renounced by the Court in *Timac Agro* and in *W AG*. The *W AG* decision makes it clear that comparability should be examined differently depending on whether the exemption is granted by domestic or tax treaty law. The CFE ECJ Task Force has reservations regarding this distinction. For the taxpayer, exemption has the same economic effects regardless of whether is adopted through domestic law or tax treaty law. Moreover, *W AG* departs from the Court’s reasoning and thinking in *Lidl Belgium*, which also concerned Germany and the same rules. Ideally, the Court would have made this explicit. Finally, it remains to be seen if *Marks and Spencer* is still “good law” or if *W AG* was one of the final nails in the coffin of the “final loss” doctrine.

\(^{49}\) UK: ECJ, 10 Apr. 2008, Case C-309/06, *Marks & Spencer plc v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Customs and Excise*, supra n. 35, para 72.

\(^{50}\) See Opinion of AG Collins, Case C-538/20, *W AG*, supra n. 5, paras 74-75.